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ABSTRACT
Managing IT-related security incidents are a growing important issue facing the organizations in IT
security risk management. We have used design science approach to develop an artifact to measure
different organizations capabilities and maturity to handle IT-related security incidents. In this paper,
we present how we have tested and will test the artifact on several different Swedish organizations.
The participating organizations come from both the private and public sectors and all organizations
handle critical infrastructure which can be damaged if an IT-related security incident occurs.
Organizations had the opportunity to evaluating the actual model itself but also to test the model by
calculating the organization's escalation capability using a query package for self-assessment. In this
paper, we present the results of the self-assessment which indicate an overall low level of maturity in
Sweden. The most remarkable result was only 20% of the participating organizations in the study had
"Knowledge and Education" maturity above the lowest levels.
Keywords: Incident escalation, Maturity models, IT security risk management, Incident management.

INTRODUCTION
The Swedish National Audit office concludes in a recent report that for Government agencies
the overall capacities to handle the consequences which can arise from serious information security
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incidents are largely unknown. Overall risk evaluation is currently lacking and instead there is
uncertainty how strong the protection is and which incidents have taken place (NAO 2014). Managing
IT-related security incidents are a growing important issue facing many organizations in Sweden and
around the world. To manage escalation of incidents, organizations need established crisis teams with
reporting channels and related report management tools that can handle incidents that do not require
immediate action or escalation.
As part of a doctoral research program at the Department of Computer and Systems Sciences,
Stockholm University we are carrying out a research projects in IT security risk management. The
purpose of our research is providing a solution to this growing problem of managing IT related
security incident. In our research, we have used design science approach to propose a mature model to
be used by organizations and authorities to measure the capability to escalate IT related security
incident both within and between organization and authorities. The advantage to use a maturity model
is that it makes it possible to obtain a measurable result to compare and stepwise improve the
organization capabilities. The maturity model could for example be used by organizations and
regulators to understand where shortcomings exist and help define target and action to improve
managing of information security.
We have divided the rest of the paper into 4 sections. In the first section, we present different
related works. In the second section, we describe our research plans and our maturity model for
escalation capability. In the next section, we present the background for and the result of the study. In
the last section, we conclude the paper with a discussion of how our model is developed and tested.

BACKGROUND
IT Security Risk Management
The International Standard Organization (ISO) has established a standard for IT Security Risk
Management; ISO/IEC 27005 (ISO 2013). The term IT Security Risk Management refers to
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approaches and methods that lead to cost effective security solutions and countermeasures. This is
done by a process of measuring the security risk to IT systems and assuring adequate levels of
protection. IT Security Risk Management is a continuous process and consists of the following steps
(i) Risk monitoring, (ii) Risk Assessment/Risk Treatment, and (iii) Risk communication. The National
Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) has introduced a framework for Enterprise-wide Risk
Management using three different levels or tiers where IT security risk management decisions are
made: (i) Top management, (ii) Middle management, and (iii) Operation (NIST 2010).
For our research we have combined the ISO and NIST frameworks. The reason for this is that
we assert that in practice each organizational level has its own individual Risk Assessment / Risk
Treatment, Risk Monitoring, and Risk Communication processes. Since risk management decisions
are made at different levels in an organization it is extremely important that the communication
between the different organizational levels function efficiently work and that there are tools that can
measure and monitor the efficiency of communication. Management of IT-related security incident is
an area where communications between the different levels are critical. Our escalation Maturity Model
represents an attempt to measures and help organizations improve the communication of risk decision
between the levels within and between organizations.
Escalation and escalation of IT-related security incident
The term escalation in the vernacular is used to describe how conflicts issues are handled by a
higher level in the organization or society (Kahn 1965). We instead use the term when one level seeks
assistance or informs a higher level about an issue it cannot handle. This means in both cases that you
also pass the responsibility for dealing with the IT security risk to a higher level.
When defining IT-related security incident we have used the definition from Swedish Civil
Contingencies Agency (MSB): “An IT incident is an undesired and unplanned IT related incident
affecting the security of the organization's or society's information processing and that may cause a
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disruption of the organization's ability to conduct its operations” (MSB 2012). Examples of IT related
incidents are disruption in software and hardware, loss of data, security vulnerabilities in products,
external attacks, human errors in handling, interference in the operating environment, and external
events.

Figure 1. Handling of incidents
In Figure 1, we outline how different security incidents are analyzed with help of a given
assessment process and depending on the outcome determine if the incident should be accepted,
resolved or escalated. There could be many reasons to escalate. One reason could be budgetary
considerations as it could be necessary to implement new expensive countermeasures. Another
example is that the incident is so serious that help from a higher level is needed. Escalation of an ITrelated security incident will probably lead to risk treatment of some kind. For example, if a crisis
occurs, the organization must respond and recover from the damage the incident has caused. If the
incident does not require immediate action, this could lead to that, in the future, new countermeasures
to deter, prevent, and detect should be installed if similar incidents will reoccur.
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Maturity models
The capability maturity model was first described by Humphrey who used maturity models for
assessing software engineering capability of contractors (Humphrey et al. 1987). ISO discuss design
principles of maturity models. There exist two types of process categories: Basic Process set and
Extended Process set (ISO 2008). Pöppelbuβ describes three purposes for using maturity models: (i)
Descriptive, (ii) Prescriptive, and (iii) Comparative (Pöppelbuβ et al. 2011). The Risk IT Framework
from ISACA presents how maturity models could be used to recognize on what maturity levels
different IT-security risk management processes are (ISACA 2009).

APPROACH
Introduction
The reason we have chosen a design science approach is that we need to develop an artifact
where we can use different cases to validate our model. Design science research methodology consists
of 5 steps (Vaishnavi and Kuechler 2004). First we gather information of the real-world problem. The
next step is a tentative design. In the third step an artifact is developed. In the next step the artifact is
evaluated with help of performance measures. In the last step the design processes are completed and
conclusions are drawn. These steps are iterated until the real-world situation is improved. Our research
is divided into three cycles. First we constructed the primary version which was evaluated with help of
IT security specialist from both the private and public sector and also from the academic world. We
made some improvement based on the evaluation. Version 2 of our model was ready late 2014 and
was tested on different organization which is described later in this paper. In cycle 3 we will create test
scenarios which will be used by a number of organizations with different self-evaluated maturity
levels. A security specialist from these organizations will describe how the organization will handle
these test scenarios judge by an independent observer, who is unaware of the organization establish
maturity level. The result will hopefully result in enough empirical data to confirm or refute our
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hypothesis that there a correlation between how an organization could handle an incident more
efficient way (e.g. time to solve the problem) and higher maturity level for the organization.
The escalation maturity model
As ISACA’s maturity model (ISACA 2009) our model consists of a matrix with different
maturity levels as rows and different maturity attributes as columns as shown in Figure 2. We have
used the same five maturity levels as Humphrey (Humphrey et al 1987). We have also, as ISACA,
added a sixth level "Non-existent". Regarding the maturity attributes, we have used ISACA's maturity
model as a starting point but adapted the attributes around the management of IT-related security
incidents.

Figure 2. Escalation maturity model
The escalation maturity model has 6 different maturity levels. Level 0 “Non-existent” implies
that different processes are not applied at all. Level 1 “Initial” is when the needs for measures have
been identified and are initiated but the processes that are applied are ad- hoc and are often
disorganized. Level 2 “Repeatable” is when measures are established and implemented and the
various processes follow a regular pattern. Level 3 “Defined” is when measures are defined,
documented and accepted within the organization. Level 4 “Managed” is when processes are
monitored and routinely updated. Level 5 “Optimized” is when processes are continuously evaluated
and improved using various performance and effective measures tailored to the organization's goals.
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There are also six different maturity attributes which are fairly obvious when we want to assess
an organization's escalation capability. It goes without saying, the employees must have “Awareness”
of IT-related security incidents. There must be a clear allocation of “Responsibilities” for IT-related
security incidents within the organization. “Reporting” channels of IT-related security incidents must
be clearly defined. There must exist “Polices and standards” when escalation of IT-related security
incidents should take place. “Knowledge” requirements for the different categories of employees of
IT-related security incidents must be defined. There must be “Procedures and tools” how escalation
of IT-related security incidents should be managed.
The query package.
The designed model artifact also includes a query package. The idea is that after the
organizations have responded to the questions in the query package, it shall it be possible to determine
the maturity level of the different maturity attributes. The number of questions in the current version is
37. The answer to each question (one or more) of the different maturity levels and attributes are “Yes”
or “No”. In this version we also have the response alternative “Do not know” which we in this context
have interpreted as a “No” answer.

Figure 3. Example of questions in the query package
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Figure 3 shows examples of questions for the different attributes and to which maturity level
each question belongs.
All of the maturity attributes in one maturity level must be satisfied before the next level can be
obtained. It is important also to mention that the maturity level for various processes within one level,
also apply for the next level. To find the current maturity level one needs take the maturity attribute
that has the lowest value.

THE STUDY
Introduction
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), together with the Department of Computer
and Systems Sciences (DSV) at Stockholm University has conducted four seminars during April 2015.
The participating organizations, who were invited by MSB, came from three sectors namely Trade and
Industry, Governmental Agencies, and County Councils and Municipalities. Thirty three persons
representing an information security function from the different organizations attended the seminars.
The seminar was divided into two parts: (1) information classification of indicators and (2) a maturity
model for measuring organizations escalation capability to handle IT-related security incidents. The
first part was held by MSB. In the second part of the seminar individuals from the university presented
the maturity model as well as the query package that was related to the model. An evaluation form
where the participants were able to evaluate the maturity model was also presented. After the end of
the seminar copies of the query package for self-assessment and the evaluation form were distributed
the participants. The different organizations were expected to submit, at least the evaluation form, in a
pre-paid letter to the university.
The organizations that responded belong to the following sectors: Trade and Industry (7 out of 8
possible), Governmental Agencies (4 out of possible 8), and County Councils or Municipalities (10
out of possible 17). The number of participating organizations that submitted the evaluation form was
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21. The organizations that also sent in the query package were 16. This paper only describes the result
from the self-assessment that the organizations have done with help of the query package. If we look
at the person who answered the query package came from organizations with the following
characteristics. The organization's size, in terms of number of employees, most organizations had more
than 250 employees. All organizations had their own IT department. The majority of the organizations
had an IT support department. Most of the organizations had their own IT operation department. All of
the organizations handled critical infrastructure that can be damaged if an IT-related security incident
occurs.

Result of the self-assessment
16 organizations submitted the query package. Many of these organizations had used the
opportunity to respond "Do not know" to one or more of the questions in the query package. When we
went through the answers we decided to not include those organizations that had answered "Do not
know" to more than 25% of the questions. We concluded that in this case the representative who
answered the questions has so poor knowledge of the organization in question that was not relevant to
use the rest of the answers. After this review 10 organizations remained where the majority (7 of 10)
had responded ”Do not know” to less than 10% of the questions. In the cases where the representative
has responded "Do not know" to a question we interpreted this as a "No" answer. The results of each
maturity attribute from the remaining 10 organizations are presented below and are summarized in
Figure 4.
The result for the maturity attribute “Awareness” gives a somewhat mixed picture. One
organization (of possible 10) did not understand the need for awareness among employees. The
employees from 2 of the organizations seem to have at least some form of awareness of IT-related
security incidents. For 2 of the organizations the employees also were aware how incident can affect
the organization. Employees from 3 of the organizations also had good knowledge of different defined
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and documented IT-related security incidents. Two organizations had continuous evaluation and
improvement of employees’ awareness of IT-related security incidents.
The result for the maturity attribute “Responsibility” shows that a number of organizations (4
of possible 10) do not understand the need for accountability of IT-related security incidents. For 2
organizations the accountability for IT-related security incidents is established and implemented and it
is clear which responsibilities that different employees have. For 2 of the organizations the
accountability for IT-related are defined, documented and accepted by the organizations. Two of the
organizations have ccontinuous evaluation and improvement of the accountability for both the
technical and administrative management of IT-related security incidents.
The result for the maturity attribute “Reporting” shows that for the majority of the
organizations (5 of possible 10), reporting of IT-related security incidents to the management has been
identified and initiated. For 2 of the organizations reporting channels of IT-related security incidents
are routine updated. For 3 of the organizations the reporting channels to the management of IT-related
security incidents are also continuously evaluated.
The result for the maturity attribute “Polices and standards” also gives a somewhat mixed
picture. Two of the organizations did not understand the need for policies and standards for IT-related
security incidents at all, while for 1 organization polices and standards is at least identified and
implemented. For 2 of the organizations policies and standards for IT-related security incidents are
also establish and implemented. For 2 of the organizations both technical and administrative policies
and standards for IT-related security incidents are defined, documented and accepted by the
organization. For 1 organization both technical and administrative policies and standards for IT-related
security incidents are routinely updated. Two of the organizations had continuous evaluation and
improvement of both technical and administrative policies and standards for IT-related security
incidents.

Proceedings of the 11th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Dublin, Ireland December 10, 2016

10

Wahlgren et al/ A Maturity Model for Measuring Organizations Escalation Capability of IT-related Security Incidents in Sweden

The most surprising results for the different maturity attributes were “Knowledge and
education”. A very large number of organizations (8 of possible 10) do not understand the need for
employees’ knowledge and training on IT-related security incidents. The implication of this is that
these organizations among other things have not identified the knowledge requirements and training of
employees on IT-related security incidents and that education plans are not defined and documented.
Only 1 organization knowledge requirements and education plans for employees on IT-related security
incidents have been established and implemented. For 1 organization both technical and administrative
knowledge requirements and education plan for employees on IT-related security incidents are
routinely updated.
The result for the maturity attribute “Procedures and Tools” shows that 1 organization seems
to not understand the need for procedures and tools for management of IT-related security incidents.
For 2 of the organizations procedures for managing IT-related security incidents have been identified
and initiated. The majority of organizations (5 of possible 10) have procedures for managing ITrelated security incidents that have been defined, documented and accepted. For 1 organization
procedures for managing IT-related security incidents are automated and routinely updated. For 1
organization, these procedures are also continuously evaluated and improved.
When the responses from the participating organizations are analyzed, it turns out that only two
organizations have reached the total maturity level "Repeatable" respectively "Initial". All other
organizations have only reach the overall maturity level "Non-existent". The criterion for an
organization to reach a total maturity level is that the organization has reached that level for all
maturity attributes. If an organization, for example, shall reach the maturity level “Defined”, all the
individual maturity attributes, at least, must have reach the maturity level “Defined”. Because of this,
just two organizations have reached a total maturity level that is higher than the level "Non -existent".
The main reason is that so many organizations only have obtained the maturity level "Non-existent",

Proceedings of the 11th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Dublin, Ireland December 10, 2016

11

Wahlgren et al/ A Maturity Model for Measuring Organizations Escalation Capability of IT-related Security Incidents in Sweden

especially for the maturity attribute 'Knowledge and education' and the maturity attribute
"Responsibility".

Figure 4. Maturity levels for all maturity attributes
To get an idea of the extent of actions that each organization must perform to reach the next
maturity level, we have introduced the concept of "Alignment efforts". If an organization has
answered "No" to a question in the query package, this will lead to that at least one action must be
performed if the organization wishes to reach the next maturity level. We realize of course that the
actions needed to meet the requirements that a question suggest can vary strongly but still think that
"Alignment efforts" gives a pretty good idea of the amount of work that an organization must perform
in order to reach the next maturity level. We define "Alignment efforts" for a specific maturity level is
the sum of the questions with the answer "No" to all of maturity attributes of that maturity level,
divided by the total number of questions for all maturity attributes of that maturity level. We define the
"Total alignment efforts" to reach the highest maturity level (Optimized) as the sum of questions with
the answer "No" for all maturity attributes, divided by the total number of questions for all maturity
attribute. Figure 5 shows the "Alignment efforts" (Number of actions) that the organizations in the
study must perform to reach the different maturity levels.
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Figure 5. Alignment efforts to reach next maturity level
CONCLUSIONS
It appears from the study that the overall maturity to handle the consequences which can arise
from serious information security incidents is low. However, before you can know and compare these
levels among organizations a calibration and deepening of the questions seems to be necessary if
organizations should be able to use the maturity model as a tool for self-assessment. Several terms also
need to be better defined. This could be the reason that many organizations responded "Do not know"
to many of the questions. If the respondent had more time to examine a particular factual situation the
answer to the question may have been different. Other reasons could be that the requirement for
different maturity attribute that the organizations should achieve could be inaccurate or unclear. The
query package in its current state is probably more suitable in an interview situation. In parallel with
this study some students at DSV have used to the questions in the query package when they
interviewed two organizations in the financial sector (Wahlgren et al. 2016) and they had not the
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slightest problem getting answers to all questions because at any ambiguities with a question they
could provide the respondent with additional information.
We will therefore make several changes to our maturity model, and then we will develop a webbased tool, including a Help function, to assist organizations in the self-assessment process. The tool
will be used by organizations to enter answers to the questions in the query packet and then
automatically calculate the total level of maturity as well as the maturity level of the individual
attributes. The tool will also calculate the Alignment efforts and suggest what action the organization
could take to achieve the desired level of maturity. We will use English when we define our new
maturity model so that it is possible to use our web-based tool internationally. To verify our new
maturity model and the web-based tool we will use the tool on some organizations both in and outside
Sweden. We will then continue with cycle 3 of our research where we will create a number of test
scenarios that involve IT-related security incidents. We will select a number of organizations with
different self-evaluated maturity levels. Then a security specialist from these organizations will
describe how they will handle the test scenarios. The result will be judge by an independent observer.
The result of cycle 3 will then establish the predictive ability of our maturity model.
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